Hermeneutic and culture

 

Hermeneutic and Culture

©By Abdel Hernández san Juan

   Written in English and translated to English 

by Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Hermeneutic and exegesis: Differences of the subject positions

   The purposiveness of this essay is focused in discussing several theoretical and hermeneutic problems almost undiscussed in the hermeneutic tradition and however crucial to stablish distinctions between hermeneutic and exegesis. Hermeneutic and exegesis are indeed similar concepts, both are immediately related to interpretation but in a subtly differentiated forms, the field of hermeneutic encompass much more issues than just the interpretation or reading of texts while exegesis is more constrained to the interpretation of texts. 

    Thinking in hermeneutic putting aside exegesis by the moment, as I demonstrated in my essay The intramundane horizont, understanded at a level that presupposes the reestablishment of the phenomenological world of life, or the so-called present of the present in Derrida terms as he discussed it in respect to hurssel, his named “alive present”, as well as presupposing such a world in the context of our decursive experience, meaning the happening of our ordinary quotidian life in a sense that after the Popper distinctions between the concepts of worlds, Shutz and Habermas discussed, hermeneutic fulfill an ontological place.

     In fact, in the world of life, when we are not considering pre-texts or texts to be readen under it, but saying hermeneutic as the ways we have to endowed of sense activities by the mean of which we make interpretative senses of our own experiences, hermeneutic is fusioned with phenomenology while paradoxically without losing however its specificities, certainly we continue differencing in the world of life what correspond to hermeneutic and what to phenomenology, the second one is referred to the establishment of the idea itself of world to the body, impressions and subjectivity, while the first one to how that world acquire the weaves creates the relations of sense that endowed that world as intramundane, the meaningfulness interior to our practices.

    The ontological comprehension of hermeneutic at this level, however, was not a discernment of Gadamer. Although the Habermas interpretation of Gadamer may leads us to a reinterpretation of Gadamer focusing the attention on the relation between hermeneutic and pragmatism, such a relation, which even is not as such and as much well developed in Habermas as I have focused and developed it in all its consequences in a really elaborated form, was not inclusive to Gadamer himself. 

   Moreover, outsiding the practical world of life and returning to the issue of pure being considered as an abstract issue out of a world as for example discussed by Hegel, Heidegger or Derrida, Gadamer certainly developed the possibility of a relation between being, aesthetic and interpretation which without a practical world, advanced the possibility for hermeneutic to work in an ontological level. In this sense we should recognize his worthy.

    While in both cases, lifeworld and aesthetic, regarding the former distinction Habermas-Gadamer, the subject is positioned in between something that simply is without extrinsecation to it and the self-source of him or her self-perception, in both cases we don’t have yet a subject in front of a text ready to be read, decodified or interpreted. Thus in both cases hermeneutic works ontologically instead of as a form of the subject extrinsecation of a text as something external and outer of his subjective position to be read as in exegesis. Whence, if we are working hermeneutic ontologically in whatever form regarding world of life or through the pure relation between being, aesthetic and interpretation, we should attempt to locate under it the position of the subject as working differently than in exegesis.

    This distinction between hermeneutic and exegesis is crucial, although in both cases we are speaking on interpretation, the position of the subject is internally and externally different with independence of the consideration about if such a text in the case of exegesis is considered as  already given outside as pregiven, considered as a pre-text, as a language object as in semiotic or as a form of textualization attempting to read as text the non-textual.

   Of course, through a kind of alterity of him or herself, or through an alter ego the subject might imagine by the effects of universal presuppositions how that which he or she have experienced in the ontological level of hermeneutic elucidations, explications, makings of sense or interpreting, may be similar or equal to another subject’s experiences, but this is not yet reading. 

   Under exegesis, the subject is positioned in front of a text produced even sometimes by another subjects. 

   Someone may argue at this point that in the case of intersubjective communication the hermeneutic elucidation and explicitation process by one of the subjects in respect to another is developed under an interpretation in a form similar to exegesis since something said is being elucidated.

    Well, this is an interesting point to be tie up and clarified. In speech act the subject is certainly in front of a certain enunciation to be interpreted but in such a situation the process of making sense, elucidation and explicitation rule over or command the situation, nothing is there as the autonomy or the independence of a text to be considered itself, what we have in any case is far to be exegesis yet.

    In this sense we might say that in the ontological hermeneutic level nothing is like exegesis while in the reversal sense we must yes find a certain level of ontological hermeneutic inside certain forms of exegesis, for example, in certain forms of increasing or stricken of hermeneutic ontology into the domains of exegesis as when the elucidation of texts seems to be a part in a weaved or a texere, but in this cases we must not therefore speak of hermeneutic, but instead of hermeneusis meaning as a way to capture or seize under the sis the general sense of the dynamics of culture under senses. The distinction between sis and tic is here pivotal, the later overline the activity of elucidation or making sense by the subject interpretably, the former overline an alive texere or weaves of culture dynamics under micro senses.

  In fact, intersubjective communication as well as the contingencies of meaning others continue then working at the ontological level of hermeneutic to the subject, but when such enunciations are not addressed toward him, but toward others and overall when such enunciations acquire the form of outcomes to many subjects at the same time the subject have to interpret a text then we start the readings of exegesis, like it happen under interpreting a literary work, philosophical or of fiction, a novel, a films or a visual art work.

Hermeneutic and Exegesis: similarities of the subject positions/an analysis of religion homology

     Now in both cases hermeneutic and exegesis as forms and moments of interpretation we have of course similarities, for example, we have under both a kind of humble position to the subject, a certain discernment of a horizont of humbleness rule over or command the specificities of hermeneutic, even in reading texts when we start to call exegesis also a form of hermeneutic or in reverse hermeneutic a form of exegesis, let explain why, if we said that our attitude in front of the object to be elucidated will be interpretative something presuppose indeed a humble position, if our relation with the text will be interpretative mean accepting a receptive relation, it is less about our pregiven sense of the true and or about our wishes to possess and more about listening something to be comprehended, in this sense the general epistemology of hermeneutic including exegesis is equivalent and similar to the kind of ethical codes we have in front of religion, in a few words, the relation between hermeneutic and culture on the one side and between culture and religion, on the other, is one of an homology. 

   So we have in hermeneutic a kind of equidistance coincident with the ethic of theology and religion, beyond if we are or no religious in terms of consmovisions or believes in some religion, certainly what characterize the relation between religion and culture is precisely the explicitation about that we don’t have the domain on all the territory of true, that always a part of the true will fall out of our reach.

   Thus, this idea of true in theology may be defined as homologue with the idea of true implicit in hermeneutic also in exegesis, if the interpreter don’t have access to comply the intentionality of the author of a text even supposing to have some access, nothing guaranty the same interpretation to many interpreters in a similar situation even in front of the same text or things to be elucidated, the heterogeneous irreducibility of interpretations and polysemy’s in the interpretation of a text certify the fact that nothing might be say on the internal true of the text and nothing on the internal true of interpretation more than accepting that indeed the true of the relation between interpretation and the text is an hermeneutical, interpretive one true.

   If god exist as a regent of the source of the world only to god must be conceded a relation to the idea of true beyond us and whence our relation with our own knowledge must start by accepting this humble position, that our relation to what we interpret should cede without voluntarism in favor of accepting us humbles in front of the true, if I accept that the true of my relation with the text will be hermeneutic I accept to said something on it interpretably so that I am not over or upon the text while also the text is not necessarily upon me, my contribution will consist about how rich, versatile or variate, attractive or interesting my interpretation could be and this is something veritable only by the linguistic community, in religion nothing is over or upon the community of believers, in hermeneutic nothing is over or upon the language community, nothing is over the general culture in which my interpretation and the text relates in between.

    With this we are not negating or relativizing the scientificity of hermeneutic, I myself had developed scientific essays of hermeneutic demonstrating the reach of an hermeneutical procedure around several phenomena’s in society, culture, language as in the ontology of the life world, but only precising a correlate of ethic position between hermeneutic and culture and religion and culture as an homologous one as well as distinguishing the different position of the subject first and its similarities later characterizes hermeneutic and ontology on the one hand and exegesis and texts on the others.

   If we are speaking on the objective space of society understanded as a contingent co-current world of many others with their own interpretations, no one can guaranty the coincidence of various interpretations of the texts, in a similar form within religion it is impossible to guaranty one interpretation of the religious texts and tradition, something Habermas discussed in regard to Gadamer arguing the reason to a criticism beyond just interpretation.

   How can we stablish an agreement on the internal true of the text when such countless interpretations are not coincident in between, how to be agree on the ontology of the text?.

The Nudes of Empty immanence

    Certainly, and here start the issue discussed by Terry Eagleton we can consider in terms of literary criticism as a Marxist issue. 

   Eagleton set up a well know example to illustrate the implications of such a relativism, he called out and back Russian formalists question on the ontology of the text about what is it that can we consider literary itself?, how to be agree about what literacy is? and when a text must be defined as literary?.

    He choiced and take a way a fragment of text, a phrase from a novel and introduced it to a groups of man’s speaking in a bar asking the question about if that phrase can be considered literary to receive the answer by all the presents that of course it was not to later let them know that it was literary since he take it from a novel. 

   In a counter critical exercise Eagleton choiced a phrase taked from an ordinary dialogue in a bar an introduced it within a group of novelists and poets asking to them if they consider it literary to receive the answer by all the presents that of course it is literary to later let them know that it was not since he take it directly from a dialogue in a bar.

   As we know the Eagleton example was set up to later develop an strong critique to the presuppositions of almost all the epistemologies in literary criticism tendencies to adjudicate immanence and ontology to the texts, phenomenology, hermeneutic, semiotic, pychoanalis and marxism, to made explicit the transference of such epistemological presuppositions to the ontology of the text negating any possibility to adjudicate immanence to the texts itself as his examples made it obvious.

  However, at the end, after examining all the consequences of Eagleton objections marxist criticism is also obligated to say something on the text itself other ways is the renounce to interpret it. 

  Marxist criticism as any other form of criticism have to in a last instance and in an equal form take the text by itself and interpret it choosing to do so certain presuppositions and parameters.

    Whence, hermeneutic superates marxism or at least marxist literary criticism, like empiricism and positivism is obligated to be subordinated to hermeneutics. The critical Eagleton nude on the relativism of the immanence of the text is then waited from the other side, immanent or not, the text will have to be interpreted and the hermeneutic true will ever be the winner.

   The marxist critical nude at the end fall in an aporía, if our interpretation will be not elucidations on the immanence of the text so that meaning can’t be fixed as a property of the texts itself as demonstrated with the bar example, then everything consist in describing the text without interpreting it but as we well know that is impossible the presupposition about that the text may be described without being interpreted is contradictory itself

Interpretation and description

     Let supposes or imagine that we have to describe a novel for example, how to do?, repiting the novel again in the description?: the possibility itself is immediately discarted, we will be obligated to separate the main characters with their characteristics, to set aside the script in a post dimension, to abstract the dramaturgy of the plot, to locate the variations and oscillations of the relation between the voice of the author and the voice of major narrators under the fiction, and to relate those instances according to paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, form and content, style and aesthetic, all this things are already implicated and a soon as attaining such a synthesis we will recognize that avoiding the repetition of the whole novel sentence by sentence as a mode of description is already stablishing a relation between a memory of reading and travels of interpretation.

   The same might be sustained about a film, sequences, scenes, frames, cinemas, characters, script, dramaturgy, earlier in the struggle of decomposing the film we are already interpreting in the effort of describing.

    If in the description I say that over the bracket there are various objects, a lighter, a book, several letters, a handkerchief and some wheels of bread I say one thing, but if in the description I say that the letters are letters of travel or intimacy letters I add a textual supplement external to the purely visual according to some information I have or an accent I set.

    If I choice the perspective of an external observer who can’t differentiate the kind of letters in question I am almost describing, but if I add some additional element such as supplementary information I am interpreting in the description itself, I said, over the bracket there are some intimacy letters or letters of travel, we may try then to difference a simple description of elements without relations in between as a list of successive contiguities, one, the next, the next and sucesibly, but as soon I am defining relations in between the elements or including in the description anything train to relate the elements I am already interpreting.

   Of who is the Lighter?, in this about one person or two?, someone was reading the letters alone or was reading it to another person?, the lighter is there because someone was smoking while reading?, or because the subject is anticipating to fire the letters? or to cook the bread?, in a few words there is not in existence a mode to describe without interpreting.

     To the phenomenological point of view in the interpretation of the art work according to Eagleton, we require to be in knowledge of the author conscience, thanks to know it directly from the author or if the author is death by reading biographies, speech, interviews, letters, manuscripts, archive materials guesting on his intentions, motivations, reasons, etc., etc. or if we don’t have any of this two ways, we must instead succor to our own acervos about signs, symbols, icons and objects in culture as well as to our cumulated memory and experience through our own conscience on universal principles of conscience as to interpret by clues the author conscience as expressed in the text, thus this one might be considered as the more usual and frequent way of interpreting.

   But phenomenology can’t avoid the fact that beyond it the text will be interpreted in a pluralist, irreducible, polisemic form by multiple interpreters, can’t avoid the fact that in any case no one will say the same on the text, even semiotic, the science with basis in phenomenology that more accurately attained to demonstrate codification and its principles of communication, can’t avoid it

The Structural Genesis of Text as Concept

   Now the issue of to arrange how must we understand sense and meaning over and beyond polysemy, the semiological elucidation of the principle of codification and the true of communication beyond all that entropy evolved within multiple interpretation is based if we are hermeneutically asking on it in the sense of exegesis on the concept of text and in such a case we need to stablish and define what are we understanding by text.

   We should not forget that the concept of text is itself an structuralist concept, without an structural cut of the relation between language and culture it is impossible to obtain and sustain the autonomy and consistency of the concept of text. On the one hand the text is defined by the activity of reading, as soon as we are reading something already everything and anything we read become to us a form of the text, but such a definition based in reading is saying nothing on text itself, it is necessary at the same time to cut structurally the relation between language and culture, and this structural cut allow us to priories’ and focus a major distinction between Saussure and Peirce.

    The main differences between Saussure linguistic and Peirce semiotic are not well discussed yet. When we said that the Saussure linguistic is structural we said mainly something, that his theory has separated langue from speech, the langue is a convention collected by the academy of the langue and we understand it by it synchronic stability, meaning, here and now the same langue without variations or with minimum variations in time, speech instead is related with the use of langue as structure which only very slowly received certain modifications.

Deep and superficial structure

   Thanks to this structural difference we may then made abstraction of the components of langue as formal facts such as the grammar, grammar is not yet meaning, it is congruence of sense, articulations of coherence, but it is the condition of possibility of meaning. a langue is also a relation of formal elements, the articles entails, the personal pronames defines singularity and plurality, the verbs defines the actions, the place and the to be of the subjects, the adjectives qualify, this is syntax, a superficial structure close to pure form. 

   Grammar is not like syntax over or thought the surfaces of forms, it is instead while near to forms more precisely between the forms ruling the logical relations in between it, thus, it is on the side of the logical principles belong to the conceptual, meaningfulness and sense level while not as pertaining to the internal level of content, meaning, concept and sense ontologically as semantique do, defined by relations between forms, it is not form itself ontologically as syntax is, how then to define the ontological place of grammar if it is not exactly on the side of content neither of form?, to get it so, we need to figure out the relation between thought and language, grammar is not on the full side of language, it have all its reality in language and as a language matter, but inhabiting the ledges or empty spaces between language and non-language, or language and thought, it is ontologically on the side of logic rising from that relation, it is then in between the forms regulating the rules of relations between forms according to a constant going and returning from thought to language logically, in this sense there is nothing deep in language than grammar to which deep structure belong, in fact, grammar is itself deep structure in language and syntax the superficial structure, in figuring it so we have a triadic relation.

Thought                                       sense                                                 genesis

Sense/Content=Semantique

Grammar=in between                 logic                                        Deep structure

Form=Sintaxis                        Superficial structure

 

Language                                                                                              meaning  

     The triadic relation is defined by grammar, syntax and semantique, the first belong ontologically to logic while it is not exactly immaterial as sense and meanings are, instead it is in between forms being a dimension of it something about which we will need later to revise and discuss the relation between form and content, it belong to the principles that relates logically forms in between according to sense and contents, the second live in the surface of forms, it is form itself ontologically, while articulated as language, the last one belong to the immaterial dimension of sense, content, meaning so that ontologically semantique is clouse to thought than to language while located as a phenomena of language, syntax is near to language than to thought and grammar is in between, whence structurally speaking semantique is on the side of genesis, grammar on the side of deep structure and syntax on the side of superficial structure, the triadic principle however explain by itself that the elements are not separated but folded one into and through the other, nothing as grammar is possible without syntax, nothing as semantique is possible without syntax and grammar while syntax’s however as ever form is more independent than grammar and semantique but yet equally affected by it.

The Significant

   The significant is by excellence the more well defined intermedia between deep and superficial structure, it is a consequence of the relation of both or in best words located in between, compared with meaning –significance--which is purely immaterial as something without a body, a corpus, a vehicle or a dimension that meet in forms.

   Derrida discussed at this point the homology of the relation between body and soul, the body is the significant and soul the meaning—the significance, the significant is thus on the side of forms inside the sign, the material one side, near to syntax than to grammar, it belong more to superficial structure and less to the deep one, but it is incomprehensible if completely diluted or disseminated in pure syntax, the grammar level sake it too or it have its source and rise in between both as an expression more of superficial and less but also of deep structure at the same time. 

   It is the anticipation in form of meaning toward it, as the word said signicant, ready to mean but without doing it yet, before the taking shape of it yet, in this sense the significant as one of the three main sides of the sign, significant/referent and/meaning or significance and paradoxically is the one side of the sign more related with the structural stability of language, why paradoxically?, well because a word must have many meanings according to how to associate it with other words as well as according to how seize its whole sense, but its form will ever be the same and equal ever

    On the other hand, the significant is the side of the sign which allow us to entrance to culture, why?, why the significant and not the significance if as we suppose a culture is nothing but a collection of meanings?, well because under meanings we are already in culture but without an entrance or an exit to it, to entrance and exist it we need in language a pure form from which to go and return inside and outside culture, culture in fact is nothing but a subsystem as parson discussed it, we also have the subsystem of the individual and of the social as well as the economic subsystem, so that to fully entrance in culture we must exit the social, a purely social will never be culture fully, equally with the individual and the economic

   And as such to the structural cut between language and culture we need forms, in this sense, structurally speaking the significant is then our way to comply and access culture from language

   In a few words, while culture is itself meaning, paradoxically, it can’t be comply and or acceded from language through contents, sense and meaning, but through significance, the surface that belong to syntax is here pivotal, nothing as a relation between language and culture might be structurally sustained than by finding in form the source of that relation, but form itself, is not sufficient to cross to culture, an intermedia one between surface and the immateriality of meanings is need to add and get the touch and pass by between language and culture, of course, language is culture and culture is language already but thus the relation is not structural, to be structural it have to be constant and relatibly invariable so to speak, and here we have the relevance of the significant and of syntax.

   When we say that the significant is mainly matter and form we need to figure out in a more deeper manner how matter and form are related in between so to return later to the significant and scrutinize what characterize it in is difference to the immateriality of meaning and significance the reflected, grounded and sometimes representational nature of the referent in denotation. 

    Let see how Hegel discussed this relation

   If we made abstraction in all its determinations, said Hegel—of all the form of something we get then as result indetermined matter. Matter is an abstract in absolute, it is impossible to see or to touch the matter, what we see or touch is ever an specific matter, meaning, the union between matter and form. This abstraction, from were matter source, is not an elimination extrinsique to form, but instead form is reduced by itself, as result to this simple identity

  Besides, form presupposes a matter with what it is related. But precisely by that both are not one in front of the other in an extrinseque form or accidental, neither matter or form exist each one by itself, matter is what is indifferent to the determination of the identity with itself from which form return as to its base. Form presuppose matter and reciprocally form is presupposed by matter, form and matter, are thus determined one by the other one, matter contain form inclusive in itself because it is form only itself and just because it have it inside, whence, form have to be materialized and matter have to be formed, meaning 

to happen in matter own identity and because form is the absolute identity with itself and contains matter in itself and because matter in it pure abstraction have form in itself the activity of form over matter and the becoming the last one determined by the former is nothing else than the superation of the appearance of indifference and diversity. This relation of determining is thus the mediation of each one with itself by the mean of its own non being but these two mediations constitute only one movement and the reestablishing of its originary identity, Pp, 397.398

    The issue of abstracting with Saussure the structural synchronic stability of langue in respect to the diachronic variability of speech might be understanded from the side of how langue is reflected in the academy of langue as a form of institutionalism, meaning, the study of language with basis in its instituted form, but at the same time, beyond institutions in the study of langue’s as available to the world of acquisition and learning, as well as the performance of it as what stablish the patters of convention is here clear as an arrange of meanings around signs, words, sentences and the principles organize it gramatic, syntactic, etc., following the same order which allow us to set aside the structural analysis in formal logics of grammar and syntax, may persuade us that something similar might be possible around meanings and not only around formal issues of deep and superficial structure, meaning that according to a similar principle both the instituted level of language as well as its comprehension from the side of the conventions entrance within learning, allow us to consider if meanings with independency of the issue of polysemy’s, entropies and multiples interpretation, are susceptible to be studied by its stability, meaning structurally.

   Well, I have a well-defined individual response to this question and my answer is yes and not. Not because meanings are highly affected by contexts and situations and we can easily demonstrate how the conventions about pre-given meanings which help the subject to acquire and learn a language to be performance, are not as such when that language is performed in a variability of interactive, communicative, situational and contextual circumstances, and yes from the moment the process of learning could be separated and studied as a moment itself. 

   An studied as such might be for example discussed as papers and books focused in both the teaching and the learning to speak and write a langue in a variety of forms, from the moment of the acquisition of a mother native langue, to the moments of learning a new langue or idiom by those how have a previous acquired native mother langue, might be also developed as theories of the teaching and learning itself, while obviously, the possibilities are limited

  Now it is indeed amazing to perceive to what point semantique is based in such an hypothesis, almost all the semantic theories in existence from the starting of semantic studies to our current days are based in a positive answer to that question, the presupposition that as well as the formalism of grammatology and sintaxsis, phonetic and lexicology is possible thanks to the structural cut of the relation between language and culture, semantic, the study of sense and meaning might be set aside and studied structurally too from the stability side as well.

   semantiques

    I am not so enthusiastic less optimistic with such a perspective which is certainly in the basis of almost all the trips and logical tables of semantic previous theory, simply because sense and meanings are itself inmaterials, related, as Derrida clarified by using the homology of the relation body and soul to separate in language matter and sense, with the soul so to speak and in doing so we are already in a territory outside the synchronic stability of structural cuts which are mainly related with form and matters as discussed above. 

   Instead of that, my perspective is focused in superficial structure, the possibilities of semantics developed from the study of syntaxes. Instead of a semantic project based in the supposed to be guaranties of convention and pre-given meaning of instituted langue, my focus is turned to the studies and sense and meanings in surfaces interactions

      Signifier and meaning are nothing else than in respect to the general logic form and content while in general logic nothing was conceived as a sign in that sense, beside the sign appeared as an issue in Aristoteles organum and later in Hegel, nothing as enteiling sign with that pair was yet suspected less even the Derrida comparison of both sides of the sign with body and soul, it was instead disseminated  or dispersed through a whole chain of things such as sensible multiplicities and palpable sensoriality and reflexivity without yet a sense of internal unity to the sign less the internal division of the sign triadic principle of signifier, meaning and referent

   Now, revisiting the issue of form and content in general logic might help to go in deep about the ontology of it, how to understand form and matter its tangibility, intelligibility, its presence as something possible to be listen, read or see as readable, graphically written, audible, etc with the intangible, ideal, stereos, immaterial side of meanings?

     Content, according to Hegel, have in a first place a form and a matter belong to it as essentials, contents constitute the unity of it. But given that this unity is at the same time determined and putted unity, content is in front of the forms, form constitute in front of content a putted being and as such represent the inessential

    Whence, content is indifferent in front of the form, while content have a form and matter itself. Secondly is also the identical in form and matter, so that form and matter are only indifferent and extrinsique determinations

    Both are in general a putted being but returning in contents to its unity. The identity of content with itself represent once the former identity indifferent to form, but content is at the same time the negative reflection of this formal determinations in itself, its unity, which firstly is only the indifferent unity in respect to form and whence also the formal unity, content is by the essence identical with itself that evolution to be the fundamental relation, but content is determined in itself not only in the matter of matter, meaning, as the indifferent in general, but as formed matter hence the determinations of forms have a material indifferent subsistence

And continuing with the issue essence Hegel sustained

     Essence have a form and formal determinations. It have an stabilitized inmediations, meaning a substrate. But essence as a related substrate, is determined essence, it have essentially form inside it. The determinations of form are now determinations inside essence, it is in the base as indetermined, so that essence is precisely in a essential matter determinated whence represent also another time the moment of the fundamental relation of forms, this is the absolute mutual relation of forma and essence, but in this essence is determined so it is a negative distinguished from form as its basis beside at the same time that essence become itself a moment of form, whence form have in its own identity the essence and essence have absolute forms in its own identity, so that we can’t ask how to add a form to an essence because the former is nothing else that the apparition of the second inside it, form determine essence, besides, form eliminates all that and become in the identity with itself of essence

      We have thus seen how form and content are related beside form and essence so that if we bring it from general logic to language in order to elucidate the ontology of the signifier as the formal and material side of the sign as to quest then how is it entailed with the ideal, immaterial side of meaning, we unveil that it work similarly to how form and content are related in between while without discarding the major place of form in respect to the substrates of the so-called essence, however, the sign is not composed only by signifier and meaning, but also by reference and referenciality

   In fact, meaning as the immaterial, ideal, intangible side of the sign beyond its relation with convention, is needed of a relation with such a third element of referentiality, since reference or denotatum is at the same time a reflected object  by the sign as something that seem to fall out  of the sign, but it is at the same time designed or indicated by it and as such is a part of it , meaning instead fall out in respect to the sign as in between significants, form and matter, and the referent so that we have then:

Sing: =significant (form) + significance =meaning (content) +reference, (referent)

     Thus, meaning is not cast over or upon not cast inside forms as contained, but it is on the one hand immaterial but on the other it is between form or matter and referentiality, so between significants and reference

     How then to relate, entail and comprehend the differences and possible relations between Saussure significants and Peirce interpretants? 

The Interpretants

   At this point we must distinguish major differences between significants and interpretants as well as between significance or meanings and interpretants, the logic of Saussure as discussed above, is ruled by the structural division between language and speech so that significants and meanings are affected by it, while the Peirce interpretant born and grow as concept from a completely different side of logic, first it born directly from philosophical logic not from linguistic issues, the relation between sensible multiplicities or palpable sensoriality as the datas of the sense and on how representation deal with it were at the Forefront of how Peirce conceived his semiotic.

   As a Hegelian, Peirce focused in the paradoxes about how substance name the subject allowing the articulations between subject and predicaments, meaning how the concept as synthetic unity reduce to a minimum such sensible multiplicities of palpable sensoriality and how from that we learn by inferences and deductions in between the properties or qualities of things and the synthesis of representation, so that the interpretants as well as all the triadic principles of Peirce including ground, representatements, correlates and interpretants grow from it on how representation relates with its objects.

  If we see from the point of view of how the concept of interpretant presuppose that a sign is in the place of an object and that many interpretants might be related in between translating each one to the another according to an endless semiosis with dispense of the object, by a moment, we may have the impression that significant and Interpretants are similars, at least if we assume the derrida critique of the concept of sign as an enclosed unity, but the Impresión will be futile, nothing as far in between than significants and Interpretants.

  The idea of significants source and arises from the structural division of form and contents which was the result of cutting language sincronically, it is nothing else than an abstraction of the static intemporal dimension of a form considered as belonging to a language understanded structurally as ever the same, the idea of the Interpretants instead source and arised from distinguishing the qualities of the objects from the synthesis of its representation, so in respect to referentiality as a cognitive matter.

   Hence the possibility of a disseminated theory of the endless chain of significants leads us to a completely different area of ontology than the idea of endless chain of Interpretants

   The interpretant is a cognitive unity, something at the simbolic level of representational synthesis replace the object and establishes itself in its place, such a replacement must thus be comprehended by the relation between the ground --the sign toward the object--, the representatements--qualities of the object reflected in the sign --see for example peirce indicial signs in comparition with icons--, the correlates which solves the duality ground/toward-representatement/reflection, in respect to referentiality grounding thus the ontology of the interpretants which start by translations=Interpretants the chain of meaning

   We should pay attention here on a major difference as to foreseen, the significantd might work endless in between the dispensing of meanings, while the interpretants may work endless in between dispensing of the objects not precisely of meanings, in  a few words the constant infinity endless of the travel through significants is a chain of form without meaning while the constant and infinity endless of interpretants between interpretants is a chain of meanings without objects, what the significants replace or substitute are the meanings which are dispersed through the play of constant differences, what the interprentant replace and substitute are the objects and the references by stablishing a chain of meanings defined by translations between interpretants which are always in the place of the objects, replacing and substituting it.

   In this sense the derredean game of significants differences without meaning toward us to the text or to texere as a weave of texts, while the so-called infinity semiosis of Peirce brings us to culture, so that the infinity endless of significants is one of form and syntax with the succor of differences, while the infinity endless of Peirce semiosis is a chain of meanings, in this sense I have a discovered proposal of both reading and epistemology, while the relation with structure of the significants source as well as goes through from Saussure to derrida from the separation of langue and speech and according to a syntactic and formal chain between substance of expression and differences, the relation of the interpretants with structure I want to propose here must be defined is a symbolic one, it might be explained not according to a prestablished cutt in real social space between forms of language use, but in respect to the relation ground, representatement, correlate interpretant which defines the cognitive basis of Peirce theory, while we can also carefully operate methodological cooperation’s between both logics, certainly significants replace meanings opening it to the game of differences but it can’t replace interpretants since interpretants are unthinkable from the significants logic.

   The interpretants are cognitive unities relatibly unclosed by principles of relation between representation and the objects of it, the significants are formal unities, the structurally of the interpretants source and arise directly from the cognitive distinction between language and reality, representation and reality, it is based and arises from its own composition and attributes, the representantment,-- the moment of the sign reflecting at the sign level something of its object, the ground, --the moment of the sign addressed to, directed to, toward or indicating the object which should be like the denotation, the correlates and the interpretants which are nothing else than the unities by which representatment and ground establish a correlate.

  The interpretants in facts are equivalents in pierce to Saussure meanings, they establish meaning according to a principle of translations between interpretants, but with a major difference, Saussure meaning is thinked as the content of the substance of expression, the meaning of a form as its content, form and matter represented by the significant, significance instead means the meaning of form, and the interpretants instead are far to it.

   far to be itself formal expressions of substance –significants--and fully immaterialized contents of that substances, --meanings-- the interpretants are little cognitive unities take shape by a triadic principle by which it is at the same time reference and replace the objects by its meanings, while the concept of meaning here is thinked in a different form, it is not the content of pregiven convention not the contents of a form, but the correlate of a ground and a representatement defines the ontology of the interpretants 

The interpretants

Representatement: reflect or a reflected dimension of the object in the sign

Ground: moment of the sign indicating or addressing the object

Correlate: the relation of both reference and replacement establish the basis of the interpretants

Interpretants: synthetic cognitive unities by which the signs translated in between stablishes a chain of meanings

   Again, according to the idea of endless circulation of significants without meanings from signicants to significants one may think about a similarity to Peirce endless semiosis but the similarity is only apparent, the circulation through significant goes within forms, it allows us to pure syntaxes and its endless is guaranty by the principle of difference, the identy of each since defined according to what it is not, difference, diffentiality thus activate here a chain of pure significants without meanings, this is the game of the marks, of each sign as pure mark and of difference as unconcient according to Derrida, a negative circulation negates meaning

   There is never significant by significant a ground, a representatment, a correlate and interpretants because the significants are not thinked as something between language and reality, representation and its objects as the interpretants are, thus, the endless semiosis of Peirce is of another kind of circulation, here what circulates is far to be a game of marks, of presence and non-presence, of identity and difference between signs and non-signs, or between the identity of what it is and what it is not, but a symbolic circulation of meanings in which the ground, that which toward the object, the representatement that which reflect the object in the sign and the correlate free the interpretants, relations between sign translating one to the other without an end, it is the task, the attempt, and attaining of another way around, the play of meaning independence from the object as a symbolic replacement of the object which inhabit to a certain point as semiosis in the game of meanings, this is why Peirce semiotic had being considered a kind of pragmatism, we should increase at this point in traing to conciliate and understand the point of contacts by which symbolism and pragmatism meet.

   We must thus identify here an aesthetic and textual circulation, that of the significants, and a cultural one, that of the interpretants, in fact, according to Eco, the sign in Peirce allow us to think about it as a cultural unity something that allow us to consider in Eco words “the replacement of cultural anthropology by semiotic”, I agree with eco to a certain levels, not necessarily of a full replacement of cultural anthropology by semiotic but about that semiotic theory must rule and control the future of cultural anthropology instead of the opposite as well as on the effort to try to consider the relation between Peirce semiotic and semantique in his discussion of Kats and fodor KF trip as in the analysis of lesemas, lexicology and the quillian model in his essay the universe of sense, but eco himself recognized how the componential semantique is limited by the constant variations of meaning among situations and contexts.

    In this sense we might attempt to attain a theoretical semantique conciliated with sintaxsis or developed from it as a matter of surfaces interactions working the interpretants as cultural theory so exploring a cooperation between derridean significants circulations and Peirce interpretants semiosis and retheorizing the possibilities of the interpretants to work in cultural theory.

   At this point an interesting quote included by eco at the absent structure might be requoted here

     It is a known thing that a whole tendency of transformative grammatical recognize in syntactic structure the objective to stablish the semantic interpretant of the enunciation, establishing in consequence the condition of selection of the itinerary discovered through the component analysis

    And quoting Chomsky

    As overlined by Kats and Fodor it is evident that the meaning of a phrase is bases in the meaning of its elemental parts and its combinations, it is also evident that the form of combination we may see in superficial structure in general is totally irrelevant to semantique interpretation, whence in many cases the grammar relation expressed at the Deep abstract structure are which determine the meaning of the phrase

   But Later Chomsky variate his position as sustained in his essay Deep structure, surface structure and semantic interpretation defining semantique interpretation in a mid-way between superficial and deep structure, another authors as lakoff attempt to constitute a generative semantique overlined the intimacy relation between syntactic phenomena’s and semantique phenomena’s

Telos/non telos

     All the previously discussed have an effect and a consequence on the temporality of thought, the issue of telos understanded as both the should be, the duty, and as the question on toward what, implicitit to the activity of theorizing and thinking in both forms as aprioris, meaning the telos evolved within presuppositions and as positioning  in terms of the horizonts --tells--while it also have consequences on the issue of non-telos

   Telos is by itself at least as discussed by Hegel related with the idea of progression involving the pleasure aesthetically of the style of writing and thinking as well as the content level without excluding the ethical issues evolved around how theorizing realize to be in relation with world of life and the quotidian.

   This is an issue of prior importance today not only in term of fashion but in term of how to deliberate the balance between telos and non-telos, as telos is progression, non-telos remark the simultaneous and synchronic temporality or process evolved in the activity of writing, how much to accent or priorize in the horizonts of theorizing telos as progression evolved in presuppositions and horizonts, and non-telos as the pay attention during the process of thinking to the here and now of the sicronic production of it?

   Well, to tell the true, at last telos is method so that under it we deliberate how each book and each essay make system with other books and essays inside a book as well as we deliberate the relation between the parts and the whole of a work in this sense the percent by which we decide to exchange the telos components of the text with the capacity to pay attention to the non-progressive temporality of the simultaneous process, non tells, the last one is nothing else than the ethical dimension of the text in regard to non-text, and in such a sense, such a deliberation of a balance is a part of the methodological results. 

   As a general comment on this remark I should say that as much as I am agree with the importance attributed by habermas to telos inside theory I am equality agree with the importance attributed by Stephen A Tyler to the non-teleological dimension of the text so like in respect to postmodern, I am exploring an intermedia balance in between both temporal dimensions, telos and non telos.

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